"'DEDICATION\n\n To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De\' Medici:\n\n Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are\n accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most\n precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one\n often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and\n similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.\n\n Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with\n some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among\n my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so\n much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by\n long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of\n antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and\n prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to\n your Magnificence.\n\n And although I may consider this work unworthy of your\n countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it\n may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a\n better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in\n the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and\n with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not\n embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with\n rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments\n whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their\n works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it,\n or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the\n theme shall make it acceptable.\n\n Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man\n of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the\n concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes\n place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of\n the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the\n plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand\n the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to\n understand that of princes it needs to be of the people.\n\n Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in\n which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered\n by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain\n that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise.\n And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will\n sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how\n unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRINCE\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I -- HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT\nMEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED\n\nAll states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been\nand are either republics or principalities.\n\nPrincipalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long\nestablished; or they are new.\n\nThe new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or\nthey are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the\nprince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of\nthe King of Spain.\n\nSuch dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a\nprince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of\nthe prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II -- CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES\n\nI will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another\nplace I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to\nprincipalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,\nand discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.\n\nI say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states,\nand those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new\nones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his\nancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a\nprince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he\nbe deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he\nshould be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the\nusurper, he will regain it.\n\nWe have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have\nwithstood the attacks of the Venetians in \'84, nor those of Pope Julius\nin \'10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the\nhereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it\nhappens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause\nhim to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be\nnaturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration\nof his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for\none change always leaves the toothing for another.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III -- CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES\n\nBut the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be\nnot entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken\ncollectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from\nan inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for\nmen change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this\nhope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they\nare deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have\ngone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common\nnecessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have\nsubmitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships\nwhich he must put upon his new acquisition.\n\nIn this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in\nseizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends\nwho put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the\nway they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,\nfeeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed\nforces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill\nof the natives.\n\nFor these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied\nMilan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it\nonly needed Lodovico\'s own forces; because those who had opened the\ngates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future\nbenefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is\nvery true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,\nthey are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with\nlittle reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the\ndelinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the\nweakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was\nenough for the Duke Lodovico(*) to raise insurrections on the borders;\nbut to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring\nthe whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and\ndriven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.\n\n (*) Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco\n Sforza, who married Beatrice d\'Este. He ruled over Milan\n from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.\n\nNevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second\ntime. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains\nto name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what\nany one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more\nsecurely in his acquisition than did the King of France.\n\nNow I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an\nancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country\nand language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,\nespecially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and\nto hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the\nprince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other\nthings the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live\nquietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and\nNormandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,\nalthough there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the\ncustoms are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst\nthemselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only\nto bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their\nformer lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor\ntheir taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become\nentirely one body with the old principality.\n\nBut when states are acquired in a country differing in language,\ncustoms, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great\nenergy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real\nhelps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there.\nThis would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made\nthat of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures\ntaken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would\nnot have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders\nare seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one\nis not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one\ncan no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged\nby your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the\nprince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and\nwishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state\nfrom the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince\nresides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest\ndifficulty.\n\nThe other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,\nwhich may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do\nthis or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A\nprince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he\ncan send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of\nthe citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new\ninhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered,\nare never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily\nkept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it\nshould happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In\nconclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more\nfaithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being\npoor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men\nought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge\nthemselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;\ntherefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a\nkind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.\n\nBut in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much\nmore, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the\nstate, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are\nexasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting\nof the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and\nall become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their\nown ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such\nguards are as useless as a colony is useful.\n\nAgain, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects\nought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful\nneighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care\nthat no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get\na footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be\nintroduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of\nambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were\nbrought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where\nthey obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the\nusual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters\na country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred\nwhich they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those\nsubject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to\nhimself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has\nacquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of\ntoo much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and\nwith their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them,\nso as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not\nproperly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and\nwhilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.\n\nThe Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these\nmeasures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*)\nthe minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the\ngreater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.\nGreece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and\nAetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was\nhumbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and\nAetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor\ndid the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends\nwithout first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them\nagree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the\nRomans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,\nwho have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for\nwhich they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is\neasy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine\nis no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it\nhappens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever,\nthat in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to\ndetect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or\ntreated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to\ncure. This it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise\nhave been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they\ncan be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen,\nthey have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them,\nthere is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,\ndealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them\ncome to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only\nto be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight\nwith Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy;\nthey could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that\never please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our\ntime:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather the benefits of\ntheir own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and\nis able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.\n\n (*) See remark in the introduction on the word\n \"intrattenere.\"\n\nBut let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the\nthings mentioned. I will speak of Louis(*) (and not of Charles)(+) as\nthe one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held\npossession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he\nhas done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a\nstate composed of divers elements.\n\n (*) Louis XII, King of France, \"The Father of the People,\"\n born 1462, died 1515.\n\n (+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.\n\nKing Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who\ndesired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I\nwill not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a\nfoothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that every\ndoor was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was forced to\naccept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded\nvery quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some\nmistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once\nthe authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines\nbecame his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the\nBentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of\nRimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the\nSienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could\nthe Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which,\nin order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king\nmaster of two-thirds of Italy.\n\nLet any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have\nmaintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid\ndown, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they\nwere numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,\nsome of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to\nstand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself\nsecure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in\nMilan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the\nRomagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening\nhimself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown\nthemselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much\ntemporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And\nhaving committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so\nmuch so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent\nhis becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into\nItaly.\n\nAnd as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and\ndeprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,\ndivides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in\nItaly he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and\nthe malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas\nhe could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove\nhim out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.\n\nThe wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always\ndo so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but\nwhen they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is\nfolly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with\nher own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she\nought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with\nthe Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got\na foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not\nthe excuse of that necessity.\n\nTherefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,\nhe increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he\nbrought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not\nsend colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure\nhim had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the\nVenetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain\ninto Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble\nthem; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have\nconsented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have\nkept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would\nnever have consented except to become masters themselves there; also\nbecause the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order\nto give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not\nhave had the courage.\n\nAnd if any one should say: \"King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander\nand the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,\" I answer for the reasons given\nabove that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because\nit is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And\nif another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the\nPope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the\ndissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to Rouen,(+) to that I\nreply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and\nhow it ought to be kept.\n\n (*) Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis\n XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles\n VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the\n crown.\n\n (+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d\'Amboise,\n created a cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.\n\nThus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the\nconditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and\nwished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that\nis reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes\nwith Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander,\nwas usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen\nobserving to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied\nto him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that\notherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such\ngreatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church\nand of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be\nattributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or\nrarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful\nis ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by\nastuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been\nraised to power.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV -- WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT\nREBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH\n\nConsidering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly\nacquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the\nGreat became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it\nwas scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole\nempire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained\nthemselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose\namong themselves from their own ambitions.\n\nI answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to\nbe governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body\nof servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his\nfavour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity\nby antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons\nhave states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold\nthem in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince\nand his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all\nthe country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and\nif they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and\nofficial, and they do not bear him any particular affection.\n\nThe examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the\nKing of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord,\nthe others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he\nsends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as\nhe chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient\nbody of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them;\nthey have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away\nexcept at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states\nwill recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk,\nbut, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the\ndifficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper\ncannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be\nassisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around\nhim. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being\nall slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and\none can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted,\nas they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned.\nHence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him\nunited, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the\nrevolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed\nin the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there\nis nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being\nexterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit\nwith the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his\nvictory, so he ought not to fear them after it.\n\nThe contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because\none can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,\nfor one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,\nfor the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the\nvictory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with\ninfinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from\nthose you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated\nthe family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves\nthe heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either\nto satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings\nthe opportunity.\n\nNow if you will consider what was the nature of the government of\nDarius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and\ntherefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in\nthe field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory,\nDarius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the\nabove reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have\nenjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised\nin the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.\n\nBut it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted\nlike that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the\nRomans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities\nthere were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them\nendured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the\npower and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed\naway, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting\nafterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself\nhis own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed\nthere; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other\nthan the Romans were acknowledged.\n\nWhen these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with\nwhich Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which\nothers have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;\nthis is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the\nconqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V -- CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH\nLIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED\n\nWhenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been\naccustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three\ncourses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the\nnext is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live\nunder their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an\noligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government,\nbeing created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without\nhis friendship and interest, and does it utmost to support him; and\ntherefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it\nmore easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.\n\nThere are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held\nAthens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they\nlost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,\ndismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as\nthe Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did\nnot succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many\ncities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them\notherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city\naccustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be\ndestroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty\nand its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time\nnor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or\nprovide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless\nthey are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately\nrally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in\nbondage by the Florentines.\n\nBut when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and\nhis family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to\nobey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in\nmaking one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern\nthemselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a\nprince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But\nin republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire\nfor vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their\nformer liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to\nreside there.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI -- CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE\'S\nOWN ARMS AND ABILITY\n\nLet no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities\nas I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of\nstate; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and\nfollowing by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to\nthe ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise\nman ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate\nthose who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal\ntheirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever\narchers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far\ndistant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow\nattains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their\nstrength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of\nso high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.\n\nI say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is\na new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,\naccordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired\nthe state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station\npresupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other\nof these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.\nNevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the\nstrongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no\nother state, is compelled to reside there in person.\n\nBut to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,\nhave risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,\nand such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not\ndiscuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet\nhe ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to\nspeak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or\nfounded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular\ndeeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior\nto those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in\nexamining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything\nto fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould\ninto the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their\npowers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers\nthe opportunity would have come in vain.\n\nIt was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of\nIsrael in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that\nthey should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of\nbondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and\nthat he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become\nKing of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus\nshould find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes,\nand the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus\ncould not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians\ndispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,\nand their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby\ntheir country was ennobled and made famous.\n\nThose who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire\na principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The\ndifficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules\nand methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their\ngovernment and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there\nis nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or\nmore uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction\nof a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies\nall those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm\ndefenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises\npartly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and\npartly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new\nthings until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens\nthat whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they\ndo it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise\nthat the prince is endangered along with them.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter\nthoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves\nor have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate\ntheir enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the\nfirst instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything;\nbut when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely\nendangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the\nunarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the\nnature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade\nthem, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is\nnecessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it\nmay be possible to make them believe by force.\n\nIf Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not\nhave enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to\nFra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things\nimmediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means\nof keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to\nbelieve. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating\ntheir enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with\nability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those\nwho envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be\nrespected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured,\nand happy.\n\nTo these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some\nresemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind:\nit is Hiero the Syracusan.(*) This man rose from a private station to\nbe Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but\nopportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their\ncaptain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was\nof so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes\nof him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man\nabolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances,\nmade new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such\nfoundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had\nendured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.\n\n (*) Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII -- CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER\nBY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE\n\nThose who solely by good fortune become princes from being private\ncitizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they\nhave not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have\nmany when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state\nis given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it;\nas happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the\nHellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might\nhold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those\nemperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens\ncame to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the\nfortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and unstable\nthings. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;\nbecause, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not\nreasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always\nlived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they\nhave not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.\n\nStates that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature\nwhich are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and\ncorrespondencies(*) fixed in such a way that the first storm will\nnot overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become\nprinces are men of so much ability that they know they have to be\nprepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,\nand that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they became\nprinces, they must lay AFTERWARDS.\n\n (*) \"Le radici e corrispondenze,\" their roots (i.e.\n foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other\n states--a common meaning of \"correspondence\" and\n \"correspondency\" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\n\nConcerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or\nfortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and\nthese are Francesco Sforza(*) and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper\nmeans and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be\nDuke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties\nhe kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by\nthe people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of\nhis father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had\ntaken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and\nable man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and\nfortunes of others had bestowed on him.\n\n (*) Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married\n Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo\n Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he procured his\n own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited\n agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-\n 1507) during the transactions which led up to the\n assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and\n along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left\n an account, written ten years before \"The Prince,\" of the\n proceedings of the duke in his \"Descritione del modo tenuto\n dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,\"\n etc., a translation of which is appended to the present\n work.\n\nBecause, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations\nmay be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will\nbe laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,\ntherefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be\nseen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not\nconsider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what\nbetter precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;\nand if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but\nthe extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.\n\nAlexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had\nmany immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his\nway to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church;\nand if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan\nand the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were\nalready under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the\narms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in\nhands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini\nand the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore,\nto upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make\nhimself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him\nto do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined\nto bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this,\nbut he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of\nKing Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of\nthe Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan\nthan the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna,\nwhich yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore,\nhaving acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to\nhold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one,\nhis forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of\nFrance: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which\nhe was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder\nhim from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and\nthat the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning\nwhen, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very\nunwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when\nhe himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the\nking made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to\ndepend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.\n\nFor the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in\nRome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,\nmaking them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their\nrank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few\nmonths all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely\nto the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini,\nhaving scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him\nsoon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the\naggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a\nmeeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at\nUrbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke,\nall of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored\nhis authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French\nor other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew\nso well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor\nPagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of\nattention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the Orsini were\nreconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power\nat Sinigalia.(*) Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their\npartisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations\nto his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the\npeople now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them\nall over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be\nimitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.\n\n (*) Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.\n\nWhen the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak\nmasters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave\nthem more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was\nfull of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing\nto bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it\nnecessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer\nRamiro d\'Orco,(*) a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest\npower. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the\ngreatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not\nadvisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but\nthat he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the\ncountry, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their\nadvocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some\nhatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people,\nand gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any\ncruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the\nnatural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro,\nand one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at\nCesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of\nthis spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.\n\n (*) Ramiro d\'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.\n\nBut let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding\nhimself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate\ndangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great\nmeasure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he\nwished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for\nhe knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not\nsupport him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to\ntemporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the\nkingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It\nwas his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have\nquickly accomplished had Alexander lived.\n\nSuch was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future\nhe had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church\nmight not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which\nAlexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by\nexterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as\nto take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself\nall the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their\naid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to\nhimself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die\nthat he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four\nthings, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had\nkilled as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and\nfew had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the\nmost numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he\nintended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia\nand Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer\nto study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom\nof Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy\nhis goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena\nyielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of\nthe Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he\ncontinued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died,\nfor he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have\nstood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces\nof others, but solely on his own power and ability.\n\nBut Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He\nleft the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the\nrest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto\ndeath. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew\nso well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations\nwhich in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those\narmies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have\novercome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were\ngood, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome,\nalthough but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni,\nthe Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect\nanything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished,\nat least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But\nif he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander,(*) everything\nwould have been different to him. On the day that Julius the Second(+)\nwas elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might\noccur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all,\nexcept that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he\nhimself would be on the point to die.\n\n (*) Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.\n\n (+) Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San\n Pietro ad Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.\n\nWhen all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to\nblame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to\noffer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of\nothers, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and\nfar-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise,\nand only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness\nfrustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to\nsecure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome\neither by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the\npeople, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those\nwho have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things\nfor new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy\na disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings\nand princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend\nwith caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this\nman.\n\nOnly can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he\nmade a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope\nto his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected\nPope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any\ncardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became\npontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he\nhad injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San\nGiorgio, and Ascanio.(*) The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him,\nRouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their relationship and\nobligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having\nrelations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have\ncreated a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to\nRouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits\nwill cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived.\nTherefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his\nultimate ruin.\n\n (*) San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio\n Sforza.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII -- CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY\nWICKEDNESS\n\nAlthough a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither\nof which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is\nmanifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be\nmore copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are\nwhen, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the\nprincipality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private\nperson becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first\nmethod, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other\nmodern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider these\ntwo examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.\n\nAgathocles, the Sicilian,(*) became King of Syracuse not only from\na private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a\npotter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous\nlife. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of\nmind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,\nhe rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established\nin that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself\nprince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that\nwhich had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding\nfor this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was\nfighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the senate\nof Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the\nRepublic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and\nthe richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom\nof that city without any civil commotion. And although he was twice\nrouted by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was\nhe able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence,\nwith the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the\nsiege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were\ncompelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him,\nhad to be content with the possession of Africa.\n\n (*) Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.\n\nTherefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will\nsee nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as\nhe attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any\none, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were\ngained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly\nheld by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent\nto slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,\nwithout mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but\nnot glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and\nextricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his\ngreatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be\nseen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.\nNevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite\nwickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent\nmen. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.\n\nIn our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da\nFermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up\nby his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his\nyouth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under\nhis discipline, he might attain some high position in the military\nprofession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,\nand in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body\nand mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing\na paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some\ncitizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than\nits liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So\nhe wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many\nyears, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look\nupon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything\nexcept honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he had not\nspent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be\naccompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and he\nentreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by\nthe Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to\nthat of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.\n\nGiovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,\nand he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he\nlodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having\narranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a\nsolemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of\nFermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual\nin such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave\ndiscourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son\nCesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others\nanswered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be\ndiscussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber,\nwhither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No\nsooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and\nslaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,\nmounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief\nmagistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey\nhim, and to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He\nkilled all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened\nhimself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in\nthe year during which he held the principality, not only was he\nsecure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his\nneighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that\nof Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare\nBorgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was\nstated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he\nwas strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in\nvalour and wickedness.\n\nSome may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after\ninfinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in\nhis country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be\nconspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means\nof cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the\nstate, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this\nfollows from severities(*) being badly or properly used. Those may be\ncalled properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are\napplied at one blow and are necessary to one\'s security, and that are\nnot persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage\nof the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding\nthey may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than\ndecrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God\nor man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is\nimpossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.\n\n (*) Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the\n modern equivalent of Machiavelli\'s thought when he speaks of\n \"crudelta\" than the more obvious \"cruelties.\"\n\nHence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought\nto examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him\nto inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat\nthem daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure\nthem, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either\nfrom timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife\nin his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach\nthemselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For\ninjuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less,\nthey offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that\nthe flavour of them may last longer.\n\nAnd above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such\na way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall\nmake him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled\ntimes, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help\nyou, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be\nunder any obligation to you for them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX -- CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY\n\nBut coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the\nprince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,\nbut by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil\nprincipality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to\nit, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality\nis obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the\nnobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found,\nand from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor\noppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the\npeople; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one\nof three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.\n\nA principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,\naccordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,\nseeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation\nof one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his\nshadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding\nthey cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of\nthemselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority.\nHe who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains\nhimself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of\nthe people, because the former finds himself with many around him who\nconsider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule\nnor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular\nfavour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not\nprepared to obey him.\n\nBesides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,\nsatisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is\nmore righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,\nwhile the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also\nthat a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because\nof their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself,\nas they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a\nhostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he\nhas not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against\nhim; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always\ncome forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him\nwhom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live\nalways with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles,\nbeing able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away\nauthority when it pleases him.\n\nTherefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to\nbe looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their\ncourse in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do\nnot. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be\nhonoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt\nwith in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a\nnatural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,\nespecially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in\nprosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.\nBut when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it\nis a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,\nand a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they\nwere open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.\n\nTherefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people\nought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they\nonly ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to\nthe people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above\neverything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may\neasily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they\nreceive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more\nclosely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted\nto him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours;\nand the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary\naccording to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit\nthem; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people\nfriendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.\n\nNabis,(*) Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,\nand of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country\nand his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only\nnecessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would\nnot have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any\none impugn this statement with the trite proverb that \"He who builds on\nthe people, builds on the mud,\" for this is true when a private citizen\nmakes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will\nfree him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates;\nwherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the\nGracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali(+) in Florence. But granted\na prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is\na man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other\nqualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole\npeople encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them,\nand it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.\n\n (*) Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under\n Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.\n\n (+) Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in\n Machiavelli\'s \"Florentine History,\" Book III.\n\nThese principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the\ncivil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule\npersonally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government\nis weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill\nof those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially\nin troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either\nby intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid\ntumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and\nsubjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of\na mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in\ndoubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince\ncannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have\nneed of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all\npromise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him;\nbut in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then\nhe finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous,\ninasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to\nadopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and\nkind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will\nalways find them faithful.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X -- CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL\nPRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED\n\nIt is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of\nthese principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in\ncase of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether\nhe has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite\nclear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by\ntheir own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise\na sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack\nthem; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot\nshow themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to\ndefend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been\ndiscussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second\ncase one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision\nand fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.\nAnd whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the\nother concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often\nrepeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are\nalways adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it\nwill be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well\nfortified, and is not hated by his people.\n\nThe cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country\naround them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits\nthem, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,\nbecause they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the\ntaking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they\nhave proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they\nalways keep in public depots enough for one year\'s eating, drinking, and\nfiring. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to\nthe state, they always have the means of giving work to the community\nin those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on\nthe pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military\nexercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them.\n\nTherefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself\nodious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only\nbe driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this\nworld are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole\nyear in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should\nreply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt,\nthey will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will\nmake them forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and\ncourageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one\ntime hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another\ntime fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly\nfrom those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.\n\nFurther, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin\nthe country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and\nready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince\nto hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage\nis already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any\nremedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with\ntheir prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that\ntheir houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his\ndefence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they\nconfer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is\nwell considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the\nminds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not\nfail to support and defend them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI -- CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\n\nIt only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching\nwhich all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they\nare acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held\nwithout either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of\nreligion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the\nprincipalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.\nThese princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have\nsubjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are\nnot taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,\nand they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves.\nSuch principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by\npowers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of\nthem, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act\nof a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.\n\nNevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the\nChurch has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from\nAlexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been\ncalled potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)\nhave valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France\ntrembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and\nto ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not\nappear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.\n\nBefore Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,(*) this country was\nunder the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the\nDuke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal\nanxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the\nother, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about\nwhom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To\nrestrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it\nwas for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use\nof the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and\nColonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in\ntheir hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and\npowerless. And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope,\nsuch as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these\nannoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness;\nfor in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with\ndifficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one people\nshould almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the\nOrsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time\nto ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the\npope were little esteemed in Italy.\n\n (*) Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.\n\nAlexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that\nhave ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to\nprevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by\nreason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things\nwhich I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although\nhis intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,\nnevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,\nwhich, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all\nhis labours.\n\nPope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all\nthe Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the\nchastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found\nthe way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been\npractised before Alexander\'s time. Such things Julius not only followed,\nbut improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the\nVenetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these\nenterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,\ninasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any\nprivate person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within\nthe bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them\nsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the\none, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the\nother, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the\ndisorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals\nthey do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions\nin Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and\nthus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among\nthe barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo(*) found the\npontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it\ngreat in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his\ngoodness and infinite other virtues.\n\n (*) Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de\' Medici.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII -- HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING\nMERCENARIES\n\nHaving discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such\nprincipalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having\nconsidered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and\nhaving shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and\nto hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of\noffence and defence which belong to each of them.\n\nWe have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his\nfoundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go\nto ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or\ncomposite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws\nwhere the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well\narmed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion\nand shall speak of the arms.\n\nI say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state\nare either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.\nMercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds\nhis state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe;\nfor they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,\nvaliant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the\nfear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so\nlong as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war\nby the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for\nkeeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient\nto make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be\nyour soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take\nthemselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble\nto prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by\nresting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they\nformerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet\nwhen the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that\nCharles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in\nhand;(*) and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the\ntruth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have\nrelated. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who\nhave also suffered the penalty.\n\n (*) \"With chalk in hand,\" \"col gesso.\" This is one of the\n _bons mots_ of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with\n which Charles VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only\n necessary for him to send his quartermasters to chalk up the\n billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf. \"The\n History of Henry VII,\" by Lord Bacon: \"King Charles had\n conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind\n of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of\n Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope\n Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into\n Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings,\n rather than with swords to fight.\"\n\nI wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The\nmercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they\nare, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own\ngreatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others\ncontrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are\nruined in the usual way.\n\nAnd if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,\nwhether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to,\neither by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in\nperson and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its\ncitizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it\nought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so\nthat he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and\nrepublics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries\ndoing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a\nrepublic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens\nthan it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood\nfor many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and\nquite free.\n\nOf ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who\nwere oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the\nRomans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.\nAfter the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of\ntheir soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their\nliberty.\n\nDuke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against\nthe Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,(*)\nallied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father,\nSforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna(+) of Naples, left her\nunprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of\nthe King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians\nand Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet\ntheir captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them,\nI reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance,\nfor of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some\nhave not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their\nambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,(%) and\nsince he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one\nwill acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have\nstood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him,\nso they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy;\nBraccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come\nto that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as\ntheir captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private\nposition had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa,\nnobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to\nkeep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had\nno means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The\nVenetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have\nacted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men,\nwhen with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was\nbefore they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight\non land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And\nin the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much\nterritory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much\nto fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under\nCarmignuola,(#) they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him\na most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),\nand, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they\nfeared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they\nwere not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose\nagain that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to\nsecure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their\ncaptains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of\nPitigliano,(&) and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not\ngain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,($) where in one battle they\nlost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much\ntrouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed\nand inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.\n\n (*) Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.\n\n (+) Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of\n Naples.\n\n (%) Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir\n John Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and\n was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body\n of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous\n \"White Company.\" He took part in many wars, and died in\n Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham,\n a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo\n Visconti.\n\n (#) Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about\n 1390, executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.\n\n (&) Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of\n San Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund,\n Duke of Austria, in 1487. \"Primo capitano in Italia.\"--\n Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442,\n died 1510.\n\n ($) Battle of Vaila in 1509.\n\nAnd as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled\nfor many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,\nin order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better\nprepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has\nrecently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more\ntemporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states,\nfor the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their\nnobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them,\nwhilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal\npower: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came\nto pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of\nrepublics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of\ncitizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners.\n\nThe first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,(*) the\nRomagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and\nSforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came\nall the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy;\nand the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun\nby Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the\nSwitzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower\nthe credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They did\nthis because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were\nunable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them\nany authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force\nof which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to\nsuch a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were\nnot to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used\nevery art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers,\nnot killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without\nransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the\ntowns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either\nwith stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these\nthings were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to\navoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought\nItaly to slavery and contempt.\n\n (*) Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio\n in Romagna. He was the leader of the famous \"Company of St\n George,\" composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in\n 1409.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII -- CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE\'S OWN\n\nAuxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince\nis called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope\nJulius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise\nagainst Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to\nauxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,(*) for his\nassistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good\nin themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always\ndisadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their\ncaptive.\n\n (*) Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of\n Naples), surnamed \"The Catholic,\" born 1542, died 1516.\n\nAnd although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish\nto leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which\ncannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw\nhimself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune\nbrought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his\nrash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and\nthe Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all\nexpectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did\nnot become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his\nauxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.\n\nThe Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand\nFrenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other\ntime of their troubles.\n\nThe Emperor of Constantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten\nthousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not\nwilling to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to\nthe infidels.\n\n (*) Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.\n\nTherefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,\nfor they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the\nruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others;\nbut with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better\nopportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one\ncommunity, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you\nhave made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority\nto injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous;\nin auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided\nthese arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose\nwith them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real\nvictory which is gained with the arms of others.\n\nI shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke\nentered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers,\nand with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces\nnot appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less\ndanger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently,\non handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he\ndestroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one\nand the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers\nthe difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the\nFrench, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his\nown soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever\nincreasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw\nthat he was complete master of his own forces.\n\nI was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am\nunwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I\nhave named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the\nSyracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like\nour Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he\ncould neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces,\nand afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.\n\nI wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament\napplicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with\nGoliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed\nhim with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them\non his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to\nmeet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of\nothers either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind\nyou fast.\n\nCharles the Seventh,(*) the father of King Louis the Eleventh,(+) having\nby good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized\nthe necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established\nin his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry.\nAfterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to\nenlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now\nseen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the\nreputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of\nhis own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his\nmen-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so\naccustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they\ncan now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot\nstand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come\noff well against others. The armies of the French have thus become\nmixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together\nare much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much\ninferior to one\'s own forces. And this example proves it, for the\nkingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had\nbeen enlarged or maintained.\n\n (*) Charles VII of France, surnamed \"The Victorious,\" born\n 1403, died 1461.\n\n (+) Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.\n\nBut the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks\nwell at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have\nsaid above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality\ncannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise;\nand this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman\nEmpire(*) should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only\nwith the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of\nthe Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised\nit passed away to others.\n\n (*) \"Many speakers to the House the other night in the\n debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most\n lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the\n British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr Balfour\n replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under\n the weight of its military obligations, he said that this\n was \'wholly unhistorical.\' He might well have added that the\n Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen\n acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that\n it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer\n recognized.\"--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its\nown forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune,\nnot having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has\nalways been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so\nuncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength.\nAnd one\'s own forces are those which are composed either of subjects,\ncitizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And\nthe way to make ready one\'s own forces will be easily found if the rules\nsuggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider\nhow Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and\nprinces have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely\ncommit myself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV -- THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF\nWAR\n\nA prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else\nfor his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the\nsole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it\nnot only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men\nto rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is\nseen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have\nlost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect\nthis art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of\nthe art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person\nbecame Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and\ntroubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other\nevils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and\nthis is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to guard\nhimself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate\nbetween the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who\nis armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that\nthe unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there\nbeing in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible\nfor them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not\nunderstand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already\nmentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them.\nHe ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of\nwar, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in\nwar; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.\n\nAs regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well\norganized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he\naccustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of\nlocalities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys\nopen out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and\nmarshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge\nis useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and\nis better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the\nknowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any\nother which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because\nthe hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for\ninstance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other\ncountries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can\neasily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this\nskill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should\npossess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters,\nto lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.\n\nPhilopoemen,(*) Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which\nwriters have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he\nnever had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in\nthe country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: \"If\nthe enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here\nwith our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best\nadvance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,\nhow ought we to pursue?\" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all\nthe chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion\nand state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual\ndiscussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected\ncircumstances that he could not deal with.\n\n (*) Philopoemen, \"the last of the Greeks,\" born 252 B.C.,\n died 183 B.C.\n\nBut to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and\nstudy there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne\nthemselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,\nso as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as\nan illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised\nand famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept\nin his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar\nAlexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written\nby Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that\nimitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and\nliberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of\nCyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and\nnever in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with\nindustry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity,\nso that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV -- CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,\nARE PRAISED OR BLAMED\n\nIt remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince\ntowards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on\nthis point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it\nagain, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of\nother people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall\nbe useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to\nfollow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for\nmany have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never\nbeen known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one\nought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to\nbe done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who\nwishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with\nwhat destroys him among so much that is evil.\n\nHence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know\nhow to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.\nTherefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and\ndiscussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken\nof, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable\nfor some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and\nthus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan\nterm (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who\ndesires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives\nhimself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous,\none rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another\nfaithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one\naffable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere,\nanother cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;\none religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every\none will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to\nexhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because\nthey can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human\nconditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently\nprudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which\nwould lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,\nfrom those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he\nmay with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need\nnot make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without\nwhich the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is\nconsidered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like\nvirtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which\nlooks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI -- CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS\n\nCommencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say\nthat it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality\nexercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it,\ninjures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be\nexercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach\nof its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the\nname of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so\nthat a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property,\nand will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name\nof liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do\neverything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his\nsubjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus,\nwith his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is\naffected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the\nfirst danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from\nit, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.\n\nTherefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of\nliberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if\nhe is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in\ntime he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that\nwith his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself\nagainst all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without\nburdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality\ntowards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness\ntowards those to whom he does not give, who are few.\n\nWe have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have\nbeen considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was\nassisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he\ndid not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of\nFrance; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on\nhis subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long\nthriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or\nconquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A\nprince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he\ncan defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he\nis not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account\na reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will\nenable him to govern.\n\nAnd if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and\nmany others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,\nand by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in\nfact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is\ndangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;\nand Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;\nbut if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his\nexpenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should\nreply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,\nwho have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends\nthat which is his own or his subjects\' or else that of others. In the\nfirst case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect\nany opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with\nhis army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that\nwhich belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he\nwould not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours\nnor your subjects\' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and\nAlexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander\nthat of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that\ninjures you.\n\nAnd there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst\nyou exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor\nor despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a\nprince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised\nand hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to\nhave a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,\nthan to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to\nincur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII -- CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS\nBETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED\n\nComing now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every\nprince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.\nNevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare\nBorgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the\nRomagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this\nbe rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful\nthan the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty,\npermitted Pistoia to be destroyed.(*) Therefore a prince, so long as he\nkeeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of\ncruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those\nwho, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow\nmurders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people,\nwhilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the\nindividual only.\n\n (*) During the rioting between the Cancellieri and\n Panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503.\n\nAnd of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the\nimputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence\nVirgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign\nowing to its being new, saying:\n\n \"Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt\n Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.\"(*)\n\nNevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he\nhimself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and\nhumanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and\ntoo much distrust render him intolerable.\n\n (*) . . . against my will, my fate\n A throne unsettled, and an infant state,\n Bid me defend my realms with all my pow\'rs,\n And guard with these severities my shores.\n\n Christopher Pitt.\n\nUpon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than\nfeared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to\nbe both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it\nis much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be\ndispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that\nthey are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as\nyou succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,\nproperty, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far\ndistant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that\nprince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other\nprecautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by\npayments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be\nearned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied\nupon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one\nwho is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which,\nowing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their\nadvantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never\nfails.\n\nNevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he\ndoes not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well\nbeing feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he\nabstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their\nwomen. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of\nsomeone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,\nbut above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,\nbecause men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss\nof their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are\nnever wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always\nfind pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking\nlife, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But\nwhen a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude of\nsoldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation\nof cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or\ndisposed to its duties.\n\nAmong the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that\nhaving led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men,\nto fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or\nagainst the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This\narose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his\nboundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of\nhis soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not\nsufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire\nhis deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal\ncause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been\nsufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most\nexcellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,\nagainst whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from\nnothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more\nlicense than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was\nupbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of\nthe Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,\nyet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate\npunished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in\nthe Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew\nmuch better how not to err than to correct the errors of others.\nThis disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have\ndestroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the\ncontrol of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed\nitself, but contributed to his glory.\n\nReturning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the\nconclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing\naccording to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself\non that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must\nendeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII(*) -- CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP\nFAITH\n\n (*) \"The present chapter has given greater offence than any\n other portion of Machiavelli\'s writings.\" Burd, \"Il\n Principe,\" p. 297.\n\nEvery one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and\nto live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience\nhas been that those princes who have done great things have held good\nfaith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect\nof men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on\ntheir word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,(*) the one\nby the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the\nsecond to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it\nis necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary\nfor a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the\nman. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers,\nwho describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to\nthe Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline;\nwhich means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half\nbeast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make\nuse of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A\nprince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought\nto choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself\nagainst snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.\nTherefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a\nlion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not\nunderstand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought\nhe to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and\nwhen the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men\nwere entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are\nbad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe\nit with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate\nreasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples\ncould be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made\nvoid and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who\nhas known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.\n\n (*) \"Contesting,\" i.e. \"striving for mastery.\" Mr Burd\n points out that this passage is imitated directly from\n Cicero\'s \"De Officiis\": \"Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi,\n unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud\n proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum est ad\n posterius, si uti non licet superiore.\"\n\nBut it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,\nand to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and\nso subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will\nalways find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent\nexample I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing\nelse but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he\nalways found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power\nin asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would\nobserve it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to\nhis wishes,(*) because he well understood this side of mankind.\n\n (*) \"Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad\n votum).\" The words \"ad votum\" are omitted in the Testina\n addition, 1550.\n\n Alexander never did what he said,\n Cesare never said what he did.\n\n Italian Proverb.\n\nTherefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities\nI have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And\nI shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe\nthem is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear\nmerciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a\nmind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and\nknow how to change to the opposite.\n\nAnd you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,\ncannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often\nforced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,(*)\nfriendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to\nhave a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations\nof fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the\ngood if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to\nset about it.\n\n (*) \"Contrary to fidelity\" or \"faith,\" \"contro alla fede,\"\n and \"tutto fede,\" \"altogether faithful,\" in the next\n paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, \"contro\n alla fede\" and \"tutto fede,\" were omitted in the Testina\n edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal\n authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the word\n \"fede\" was \"the faith,\" i.e. the Catholic creed, and not as\n rendered here \"fidelity\" and \"faithful.\" Observe that the\n word \"religione\" was suffered to stand in the text of the\n Testina, being used to signify indifferently every shade of\n belief, as witness \"the religion,\" a phrase inevitably\n employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South in his\n Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as\n follows: \"That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,\n Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his\n political scheme: \'That the show of religion was helpful to\n the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and\n pernicious.\'\"\n\nFor this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything\nslip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five\nqualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether\nmerciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing\nmore necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men\njudge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to\neverybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees\nwhat you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare\nnot oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty\nof the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and\nespecially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges\nby the result.\n\nFor that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding\nhis state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be\npraised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a\nthing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are\nonly the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have\nno ground to rest on.\n\nOne prince(*) of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never\npreaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is\nmost hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of\nreputation and kingdom many a time.\n\n (*) Ferdinand of Aragon. \"When Machiavelli was writing \'The\n Prince\' it would have been clearly impossible to mention\n Ferdinand\'s name here without giving offence.\" Burd\'s \"Il\n Principe,\" p. 308.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX -- THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\n\nNow, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I\nhave spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss\nbriefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has\nbeen in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him\nhated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he\nwill have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other\nreproaches.\n\nIt makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,\nand to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from\nboth of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their\nhonor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to\ncontend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many\nways.\n\nIt makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,\neffeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should\nguard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his\nactions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his\nprivate dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are\nirrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can\nhope either to deceive him or to get round him.\n\nThat prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,\nand he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,\nprovided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by\nhis people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason\na prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his\nsubjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From\nthe latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,\nand if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will\nalways remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they\nshould have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should\naffairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and\nhas lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist\nevery attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.\n\nBut concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has\nonly to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince\ncan easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by\nkeeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary\nfor him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most\nefficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not\nto be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against\na prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the\nconspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have\nthe courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront\na conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the\nconspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires\ncannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he\nbelieves to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind\nto a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content\nhimself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that,\nseeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other\nto be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a\nthoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.\n\nAnd, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side\nof the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of\npunishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the\nmajesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and\nthe state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the\npopular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to\nconspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the\nexecution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to\nthe crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and\nthus cannot hope for any escape.\n\nEndless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content\nwith one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer\nAnnibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the\npresent Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had\nconspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer\nGiovanni,(*) who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination\nthe people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the\npopular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in\nBologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the\ndeath of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having\ninformation that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence,\nwho up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to\nFlorence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was\nruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.\n\n (*) Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan\n 1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli\'s\n strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from\n his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had\n been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the\n Boscoli conspiracy.\n\nFor this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies\nof little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it\nis hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear\neverything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have\ntaken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the\npeople satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important\nobjects a prince can have.\n\nAmong the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and\nin it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty\nand security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its\nauthority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of\nthe nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths\nwould be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the\nhatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to\nprotect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care\nof the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be\nliable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people\nfor favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who\ncould beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the\nking. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or\na greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can\ndraw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs\nof reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in\ntheir own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish\nthe nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.\n\nIt may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths\nof the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary\nto my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great\nqualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been\nkilled by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore,\nto answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the\nemperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different\nto those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for\nconsideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the\naffairs of those times.\n\nIt seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to\nthe empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were\nMarcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son\nAntoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.\n\nThere is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the\nambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be\ncontended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to\nput up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset\nwith difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing\nto give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people\nloved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince,\nwhilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and\nrapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise\nupon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to\ntheir own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were\nalways overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great\nauthority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the\nprincipality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,\nwere inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about\ninjuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes\ncannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to\navoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they\nought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the\nmost powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had\nneed of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to\nthe people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,\naccordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.\n\nFrom these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being\nall men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,\nand benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died\nhonoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,\nand owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,\nbeing possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept\nboth orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor\ndespised.\n\nBut Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,\nwho, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not\nendure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,\nhaving given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt\nfor his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his\nadministration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as\nmuch by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince\nwishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that\nbody is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself--it\nmay be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles--you have to\nsubmit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do\nyou harm.\n\nBut let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,\nthat among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the\nfourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by\nhim unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who\nallowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the\narmy conspired against him, and murdered him.\n\nTurning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus\nCaracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men\nwho, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of\niniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad\nend; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers\nfriendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned\nsuccessfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of\nthe soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished\nand awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the\nactions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show\nbriefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which\nnatures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.\n\nKnowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in\nSclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome\nand avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian\nsoldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the\nthrone, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known\nthat he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear,\nelected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for\nSeverus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two\ndifficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had\ncaused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where\nAlbinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it\ndangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack\nNiger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected\nemperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and\nsent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made\nAlbinus his colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true.\nBut after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental\naffairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus,\nlittle recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had\nby treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was\ncompelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and\ntook from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully\nexamine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and\na most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one,\nand not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a\nnew man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme\nrenown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have\nconceived against him for his violence.\n\nBut his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent\nqualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and\nacceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring\nof fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which\ncaused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and\ncruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single\nmurders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of\nAlexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those\nhe had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst\nof his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like\ndeaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate\ncourage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear\nto die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because\nthey are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury\nto those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state.\nAntoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a\nbrother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained\nin his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and\nproved the emperor\'s ruin.\n\nBut let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to\nhold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,\nand he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his\npeople and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave\nhimself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might\nindulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining\nhis dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators,\nand doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he\nfell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and\ndespised by the other, he was conspired against and was killed.\n\nIt remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike\nman, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,\nof whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the\nthrone. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated\nand despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought\nhim into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great\nindignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession\nto his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the\nimperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity\nby having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,\npractised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger\nat the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa\nrebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy\nconspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,\nbesieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were\ndisgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so\nmany against him, murdered him.\n\nI do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being\nthoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this\ndiscourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this\ndifficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a\nfar less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some\nindulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that\nare veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were\nthe armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary\nto give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more\nnecessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the\npeople rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.\n\nFrom the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him\ntwelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend\nthe security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,\nputting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them\nhis friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the\nhands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people,\nhe must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the\nSoldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it\nis like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an\nhereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old\nprince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by\nthose who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this\nbeing an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because\nthere are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new\nones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is\nold, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary\nlord.\n\nBut returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will\nconsider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been\nfatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how\nit happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number\nin another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to\nunhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for\nPertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who\nwas heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly\ndestructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated\nSeverus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread\nin his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot\nimitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow\nthose of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which\nare necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper\nand glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX -- ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES\nOFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?\n\n1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their\nsubjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;\nothers have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid\nthemselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning\nof their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown\nand destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all\nof these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states\nin which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as\ncomprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.\n\n2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather\nwhen he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by\narming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted\nbecome faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your\nsubjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be\narmed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be\nhandled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they\nquite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,\nconsidering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and\nservice should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm\nthem, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either\nfor cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions\nbreeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it\nfollows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already\nshown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to\ndefend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore,\nas I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always\ndistributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince\nacquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then\nit is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have\nbeen his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and\nopportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should\nbe managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be\nyour own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.\n\n3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed\nto say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by\nfortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their\ntributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily.\nThis may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way\nbalanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept\nfor to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;\nrather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided\ncities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always\nassist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist.\nThe Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the\nGuelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although\nthey never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these\ndisputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their\ndifferences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not\nafterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one\nparty at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,\ntherefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be\npermitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the\nmore easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if\nwar comes this policy proves fallacious.\n\n4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the\ndifficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore\nfortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who\nhas a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes\nenemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have\nthe opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a\nladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that\na wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster\nsome animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown\nmay rise higher.\n\n5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance\nin those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than\namong those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince\nof Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by\nothers. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies\nso much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who\nat the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of\na description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be\ngained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to\nserve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very\nnecessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had\nformed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from\nthem than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect\nhis affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a\nprince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he\nmust well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who\ndid so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only\ndiscontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly\nwith great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy\nthem. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which\ncan be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is\neasier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented\nunder the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of\nthose who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and\nencouraged him to seize it.\n\n6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states\nmore securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit\nto those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge\nfrom a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use\nof formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times\nhas been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he\nmight keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to\nhis dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the\nfoundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that\nwithout them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli\nreturning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore,\nare useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one\nway they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus:\nthe prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners\nought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners\nthan from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan,\nbuilt by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the\nhouse of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason\nthe best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,\nalthough you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the\npeople hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist\na people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our\ntimes that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the\nCountess of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed;\nfor by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait\nfor assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture\nof affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist\nthe people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when\nCesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied\nwith foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then\nand before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the\nfortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him\nwho builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame\nwhoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.\n\n (*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and\n Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the\n Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499.\n A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the\n appointment: \"I have been with the signori,\" wrote\n Fortunati, \"to learn whom they would send and when. They\n tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine\n noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me\n at once.\" Cf. \"Catherine Sforza,\" by Count Pasolini,\n translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI -- HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN\n\nNothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting\na fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present\nKing of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has\nrisen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the\nforemost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds\nyou will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the\nbeginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the\nfoundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without\nany fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile\noccupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;\nthus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power\nand authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and\nof the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the\nfoundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.\nFurther, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater\nschemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and\nclearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable\nexample, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,\nhe came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his\nachievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds\nof his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of\nthem. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other,\nthat men have never been given time to work steadily against him.\n\nAgain, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal\naffairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,\nwho, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some\nextraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of\nrewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a\nprince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain\nfor himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.\n\nA prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a\ndownright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he\ndeclares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course\nwill always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two\nof your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character\nthat, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not.\nIn either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare\nyourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if\nyou do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to\nthe conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been\nconquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to\nprotect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want\ndoubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who\nloses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand,\ncourt his fate.\n\nAntiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive\nout the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of\nthe Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the\nRomans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in\nthe council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to\nstand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: \"As for that which has\nbeen said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not\nto interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by\nnot interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the\nguerdon of the conqueror.\" Thus it will always happen that he who is not\nyour friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend\nwill entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes,\nto avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are\ngenerally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour\nof one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although\nthe victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is\nindebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are\nnever so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing\nyou. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not\nshow some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally\nyourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he\nmay aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.\n\nIn the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that\nyou have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it\ngreater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction\nof one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved\nhim; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your\nassistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted\nthat a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one\nmore powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless\nnecessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are\nat his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being\nat the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against\nthe Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could\nhave been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the\nFlorentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then\nin such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of\nthe parties.\n\nNever let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe\ncourses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,\nbecause it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid\none trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in\nknowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to\ntake the lesser evil.\n\nA prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour\nthe proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his\ncitizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and\nagriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be\ndeterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away\nfrom him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the\nprince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and\ndesigns in any way to honour his city or state.\n\nFurther, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles\nat convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into\nguilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and\nassociate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy\nand liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his\nrank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.\n\n (*) \"Guilds or societies,\" \"in arti o in tribu.\" \"Arti\" were\n craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: \"Arte . . . a whole\n company of any trade in any city or corporation town.\" The\n guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr\n Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906).\n Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called\n \"artel,\" exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace\'s\n \"Russia,\" ed. 1905: \"The sons . . . were always during the\n working season members of an artel. In some of the larger\n towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--\n permanent associations, possessing large capital, and\n pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual\n members.\" The word \"artel,\" despite its apparent similarity,\n has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with \"ars\" or\n \"arte.\" Its root is that of the verb \"rotisya,\" to bind\n oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only\n another form of \"rota,\" which now signifies a \"regimental\n company.\" In both words the underlying idea is that of a\n body of men united by an oath. \"Tribu\" were possibly gentile\n groups, united by common descent, and included individuals\n connected by marriage. Perhaps our words \"sects\" or \"clans\"\n would be most appropriate.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII -- CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\n\nThe choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they\nare good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the\nfirst opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is\nby observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and\nfaithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how\nto recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are\notherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error\nwhich he made was in choosing them.\n\nThere were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of\nPandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to\nbe a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there\nare three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;\nanother which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which\nneither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is\nthe most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore,\nit follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he\nwas in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and\nbad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the\ninitiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant,\nand the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot\nhope to deceive him, and is kept honest.\n\nBut to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one\ntest which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his\nown interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in\neverything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever\nbe able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his\nhands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and\nnever pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.\n\nOn the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study\nhim, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with\nhim the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he\ncannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,\nmany riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him\ndread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,\nare thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,\nthe end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII -- HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED\n\nI do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it\nis a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless\nthey are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of\nwhom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own\naffairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with\ndifficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they\nrun the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way\nof guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that\nto tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell\nyou the truth, respect for you abates.\n\nTherefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the\nwise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking\nthe truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,\nand of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and\nlisten to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.\nWith these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry\nhimself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more\nfreely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of\nthese, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be\nsteadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown\nby flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls\ninto contempt.\n\nI wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of\naffairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,\nsaid: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.\nThis arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the\nabove; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his\ndesigns to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in\ncarrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are\nat once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being\npliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he\ndoes one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he\nwishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.\n\n (*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the\n Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of\n Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus\n became involved in Italian politics.\n\nA prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he\nwishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one\nfrom offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be\na constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the\nthings of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any\nconsideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be\nfelt.\n\nAnd if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression\nof his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good\nadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because\nthis is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise\nhimself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his\naffairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In\nthis case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long,\nbecause such a governor would in a short time take away his state from\nhim.\n\nBut if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more\nthan one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to\nunite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and\nthe prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And\nthey are not to found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue\nto you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be\ninferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of\nthe wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good\ncounsels.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV -- WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\n\nThe previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince\nto appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed\nin the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of\na new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary\none, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind\nfar tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the\npresent than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy\nit and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a\nprince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double\nglory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and\nstrengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good\nexample; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince,\nshall lose his state by want of wisdom.\n\nAnd if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in\nItaly in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan,\nand others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in\nregard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in\nthe next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the\npeople hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known\nhow to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that\nhave power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.\n\nPhilip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who\nwas conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to\nthe greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a\nwarlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he\nsustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the\nend he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the\nkingdom.\n\nTherefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their\nprincipalities after so many years\' possession, but rather their own\nsloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change\n(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm\nagainst the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they\nthought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that\nthe people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall\nthem. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to\nhave neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never\nwish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to\nrestore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will\nnot be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which\ndoes not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and\ndurable that depend on yourself and your valour.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV -- WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO\nWITHSTAND HER\n\nIt is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the\nopinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by\nfortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and\nthat no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us\nbelieve that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let\nchance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times\nbecause of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and\nmay still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes\npondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.\nNevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that\nFortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still\nleaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.\n\n (*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: \"The older\n one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty\n King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this\n miserable universe.\" Sorel\'s \"Eastern Question.\"\n\nI compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood\noverflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away\nthe soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to\nits violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,\nthough its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when\nthe weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences\nand barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may\npass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so\ndangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour\nhas not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where\nshe knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain\nher.\n\nAnd if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and\nwhich has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open\ncountry without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been\ndefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either\nthis invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it\nwould not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning\nresistance to fortune in general.\n\nBut confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be\nseen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change\nof disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes\nthat have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who\nrelies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that\nhe will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of\nthe times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will\nnot be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end\nwhich every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there\nby various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,\nanother by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one\nsucceeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of\ntwo cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,\ntwo men by different observances are equally successful, the one being\ncautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than\nwhether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times.\nThis follows from what I have said, that two men working differently\nbring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains\nhis object and the other does not.\n\nChanges in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs\nhimself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a\nway that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if\ntimes and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course\nof action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know\nhow to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate\nfrom what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always\nprospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well\nto leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn\nadventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he\nchanged his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed.\n\nPope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and\nfound the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action\nthat he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against\nBologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians\nwere not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the\nenterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless\nhe personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness\nand energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute\nand passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover\nthe kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of\nFrance, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring\nto make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it\nimpossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action\naccomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have\ndone; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his\nplans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have\ndone, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would\nhave made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a\nthousand fears.\n\nI will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they\nall succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience\nthe contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go\ncautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have\ndeviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.\n\nI conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind\nsteadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are\nsuccessful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider\nthat it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is\na woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and\nill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by\nthe adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is,\ntherefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are\nless cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI -- AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\n\nHaving carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and\nwondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to\na new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an\nopportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of\nthings which would do honour to him and good to the people of this\ncountry, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new\nprince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.\n\nAnd if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be\ncaptive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians\nshould be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the\nsoul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate\nthe capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to\ndiscover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy\nshould be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should\nbe more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,\nmore scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,\ndespoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.\n\nAlthough lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us\nthink he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was\nafterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him;\nso that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal\nher wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy,\nto the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse\nthose sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God\nto send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous\ninsolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a\nbanner if only someone will raise it.\n\nNor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope\nthan in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured\nby God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could\nbe made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you\nwill recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named.\nAnd although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and\neach one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for\ntheir enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was\nGod more their friend than He is yours.\n\n (*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal\n by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the\n title of Clement VII.\n\nWith us there is great justice, because that war is just which is\nnecessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in\nthem. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness\nis great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those\nmen to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how\nextraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:\nthe sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured\nforth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to\nyour greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do\neverything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory\nwhich belongs to us.\n\nAnd it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians\nhave been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious\nhouse; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns,\nit has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has\nhappened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us\nhave known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to\nestablish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen.\nSuch things when they are well founded and dignified will make him\nrevered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to\nbring such into use in every form.\n\nHere there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.\nLook attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior\nthe Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes\nto armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from\nthe insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not\nobedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been\nany one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune,\nthat others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time,\nand during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there\nhas been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of\nitself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria,\nCapua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.(*)\n\n (*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua,\n 1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.\n\nIf, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable\nmen who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,\nas a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your\nown forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better\nsoldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will\nbe much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,\nhonoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is\nnecessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended\nagainst foreigners by Italian valour.\n\nAnd although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very\nformidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which\na third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied\nupon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the\nSwitzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close\ncombat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards\nare unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by\nSpanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot\nbe shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of\nRavenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions,\nwho follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility\nof body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the\nGermans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood\nhelpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been\nover with them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both\nthese infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not\nbe afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but\na variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which\nconfer reputation and power upon a new prince.\n\nThis opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting\nItaly at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love\nwith which he would be received in all those provinces which have\nsuffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for\nrevenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.\nWhat door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?\nWhat envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all\nof us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious\nhouse take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all\njust enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native\ncountry may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that\nsaying of Petrarch:\n\n Virtu contro al Furore\n Prendera l\'arme, e fia il combatter corto:\n Che l\'antico valore\n Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.\n\n Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,\n And it i\' th\' combat soon shall put to flight:\n For the old Roman valour is not dead,\n Nor in th\' Italians\' brests extinguished.\n\n Edward Dacre, 1640.\n\n\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING\nVITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE\nDI GRAVINA ORSINI\n\nBY\n\nNICOLO MACHIAVELLI\n\n\nThe Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to\nclear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been\nraised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo\nand other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence\nhe intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni\nBentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city\nunder his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.\n\nThese matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and\ntheir following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too\npowerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek\nto destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon\nthis a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia,\nto which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,\nVitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant\nof Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci,\nthe Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and courage of the\nduke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise\nbring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they decided not to\nabandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the Florentines; and\nthey send their men to one place and another, promising to one party\nassistance and to another encouragement to unite with them against the\ncommon enemy. This meeting was at once reported throughout all Italy,\nand those who were discontented under the duke, among whom were the\npeople of Urbino, took hope of effecting a revolution.\n\nThus it arose that, men\'s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by\ncertain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was\nheld for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The\ncastellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there;\nso the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being\ncarried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from\nbeing drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping\nupon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being\neffected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being\nencouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the\nDiet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance.\n\nThose who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose\nthe opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town,\nshould any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent\nagain to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying\nthe common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they\nought not to wait for another opportunity.\n\nBut the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and\nOrsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli,\ntheir secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against\nhis enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against\neverybody\'s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the\nenemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering\ncourage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize\nbefore fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to\nnegotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter\nhe obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by\nenlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort:\nto all he gave money.\n\nNotwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached\nFossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the\naid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke\nresolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of\nreconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in\nany practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man\nwho had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have\nthe title of prince, whilst others might have the principality.\n\nAnd the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to\nhim to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a\nstandstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took\nevery care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such\npreparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in\nseparate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there\ncame also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found\nhimself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open\nwar, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous\nto outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of\nreconciliation.\n\nAnd that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in\nwhich he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand\nducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed\nan alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come\npersonally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the\nother hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and\nother places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and\nnot to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his\npermission.\n\nThis reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,\nagain fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in\nhis state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the\nfortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by\nthe enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends.\nBut the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed\nhis men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November\ntogether with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he\nstayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini,\nwho had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the\nenterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being\nconcluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke\nwished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if\nhe did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke\nreplied that he did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus\nbecome hostile to the Florentines, but that he was very willing to\nproceed against Sinigalia.\n\nIt happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the\nfortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give\nit up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him\nto come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being\ninvited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no\nsuspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French\nmen-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred\nlancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena\nabout the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost\ncunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for\nhim at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance would\ncast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the reconciliation,\nand that he was a man who wished to make use of the arms and councils of\nhis friends. But Vitellozzo remained very stubborn, for the death of\nhis brother warned him that he should not offend a prince and afterwards\ntrust him; nevertheless, persuaded by Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had\ncorrupted with gifts and promises, he agreed to wait.\n\nUpon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be\non 30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most\ntrusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d\'Euna,\nwho was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo,\nPagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his\nfollowers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain\nmen to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they reached\nSinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they came to the\nduke\'s quarters, where they should be seized.\n\nThe duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which\nthere were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to\nassemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from\nFano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day\nof December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade\nof about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the\ninfantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.\n\nFano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situate on the shore of\nthe Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who\ngoes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases\nof which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is\ndistant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot\nand from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs\na little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano,\nfacing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for\na good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river which\npasses by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank of it,\nand goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which\ncrosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that leads into\nSinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before this gate\nthere stands a collection of houses with a square to which the bank of\nthe river forms one side.\n\nThe Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and\nto honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant\nfrom Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men\nof the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band,\nwhich consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty\nhorsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters\nhaving been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and\nwhen the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass\nover, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and\nthe other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through\nwhich the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town.\n\nVitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a\nfew horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a\ncape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his\napproaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the\nman and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that\nwhen he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the\nduke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended\nhis house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that\nit was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers\nthat should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before\nthe duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with\ngoodwill; they were at once placed between those who were commissioned\nto look after them.\n\nBut the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in\nSinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square before\nhis quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling\nthem--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of\nOliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that\nOliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined\nOliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of\ntheir quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke;\nand he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come\nhimself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came\nbefore the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto,\nhaving made his obeisance, joined the others.\n\nSo the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke\'s quarters,\nand went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them\nprisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men\nof Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of\nOliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini\nand Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the\ndestruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and\nbearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian\nhouses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the country\nand saved themselves.\n\nBut the duke\'s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the\nmen of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had\nnot repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have\ncompletely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,\nthe duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into\na room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in\nkeeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of\nthe pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame\nfor all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di\nGravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome that the\npope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of Florence, and\nMesser Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th January 1502, in\nthe castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the same way.\n\n\n\nTHE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA\n\nWRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI\n\nAnd sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI\n\n\nCASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328\n\nIt appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who\nhave considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them,\nwho have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in\ntheir day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity;\nor have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have\neither been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so\nmean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to be\nsons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who\nthese persons may have been because they are well known to everybody,\nand, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to those who read\nthem, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly beginnings of great\nmen occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to the world that such\nmen owe much to her and little to wisdom, because she begins to show\nher hand when wisdom can really take no part in their career: thus all\nsuccess must be attributed to her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was\none of those men who did great deeds, if he is measured by the times in\nwhich he lived and the city in which he was born; but, like many others,\nhe was neither fortunate nor distinguished in his birth, as the course\nof this history will show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his\nmemory, because I have discerned in him such indications of valour and\nfortune as should make him a great exemplar to men. I think also that\nI ought to call your attention to his actions, because you of all men I\nknow delight most in noble deeds.\n\nThe family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families\nof Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in\nestate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son\nAntonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and\nfor this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an\nonly sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso\ndying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live\nwith her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where\nhe resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person\ncould have access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after\nsunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called,\nhad occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for\nseasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves\nof a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something\nresembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw\nthe hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and\nwho seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly\nfearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to\nthe house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is\ncustomary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When\nhe heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised\nor compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves\nwhat should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no\nchildren, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for\nit, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They\nbaptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As\nthe years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of\nwit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those\nlessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended\nto make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his\ncanonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with\nthis object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio was\nquite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached the\nage of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of Messer\nAntonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left\noff reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,\ndelighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running,\nleaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled\nhis companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did\nturn to books, only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty\ndeeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow.\n\nThere lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,\nnamed Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,\nbodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had\noften fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a\nGhibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman\nresided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most\nmornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the\ntop of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had\noften seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street\nin those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far\nexcelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal\nauthority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer\nFrancesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being informed\nof the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt a greater\ndesire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one day and\nasked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of a\ngentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in\nthe house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and\nthe services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased\nCastruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though\nhe stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer\nFrancesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable,\nnothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and\ntake up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and\nin a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was\ndriven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear\nthat he would not be able to hold him much longer.\n\nThus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest\nto the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was\nastonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that\nvirtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true\ngentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and\ncould manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and\ntournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others,\nand he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what\nenhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful\nmodesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to\nothers, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his equals,\nand courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved, not only\nby all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio had reached\nhis eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia by the\nGuelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist the\nGhibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces.\nCastruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this\nexpedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and\nhis name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all\nLombardy.\n\nCastruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation that he\nleft it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many\nfriends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary\nfor that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son\nthirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio\nto be his son\'s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died\nFrancesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that\ngoodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to\nthe son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father.\nUpon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of\nPagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and created\na certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former\nuniversal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical\nintentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the\nhead of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer\nFrancesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that\nCastruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and\nholding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity;\ntherefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his\neminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but afterwards\nhe grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring\nhim into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him\ndriven out of Lucca.\n\nThe Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,\nwho being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became\ntheir lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca,\nwith whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting\ntheir restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into\nhis plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the\nOpizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously\nfortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and\nmunitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few days\nin case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon with\nUguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and\nPisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed\nUguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the\nportcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling\nthe people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione\nentered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer Giorgio\nwith all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The governor\nwas driven out, and the government reformed according to the wishes of\nUguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found that more\nthan one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who\nfled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the\nheadquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most\nhostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.\n\nAs it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party\nthat the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined\nto restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in\nthe Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to\nMontecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this\nUguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number\nof German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against\nthe quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy\nwithdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and\nPescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within\nabout two miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse\nof both parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of\nUguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the\nenemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to\nbe cured, and left the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio.\nThis change brought about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking\nthat the hostile army having lost its captain had lost its head, grew\nover-confident. Castruccio observed this, and allowed some days to pass\nin order to encourage this belief; he also showed signs of fear, and\ndid not allow any of the munitions of the camp to be used. On the other\nside, the Guelphs grew more insolent the more they saw these evidences\nof fear, and every day they drew out in the order of battle in front\nof the army of Castruccio. Presently, deeming that the enemy was\nsufficiently emboldened, and having mastered their tactics, he decided\nto join battle with them. First he spoke a few words of encouragement to\nhis soldiers, and pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they\nwould but obey his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had\nplaced all his best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his\nless reliable men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly\nthe opposite, putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those\non whom he could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing\nthis order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight\nof the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy\nhim. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst\nhe moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into\ncontact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became engaged,\nwhilst the center battalions remained out of action, for these two\nportions of the line of battle were separated from each other by a long\ninterval and thus unable to reach each other. By this expedient the more\nvaliant part of Castruccio\'s men were opposed to the weaker part of the\nenemy\'s troops, and the most efficient men of the enemy were disengaged;\nand thus the Florentines were unable to fight with those who were\narrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to their own flanks.\nSo, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on\nboth flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they found\nthemselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying\ntheir valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy,\nthere being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and\nknights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had\ncome to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto,\nand Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of\nCastruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among\nwhom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was\nkilled in the first onset.\n\nThis victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that\nUguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it\nappeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of\npower, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited\nfor an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of\nPier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the\nmurderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the\nsergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven\noff by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to\nthe knowledge of Uguccione, who was than at Pisa, it appeared to him a\nproper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his\nson Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take\nCastruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio,\nfearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained\nat supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to\ndeath lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to\nhear further from his father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed\nthe hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa\nto Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own\nway; but he had not yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and\nput his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their\nlord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at\nPisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese\nwith the example of Pisa before them should close their gates against\nhim. But the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa,\navailed themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of\nCastruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city.\nThey first began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly\nin the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in\ntheir hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be\nset at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him\nfrom prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and\nwith the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no\nresource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the\nlords of Scale, where he died in poverty.\n\nBut Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,\nand he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people\nthat they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having\nobtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the\nrecovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of\nUguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a\ntreaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed a\nfort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of\ntwo months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained\nat that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in\na short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the\npass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and\nwrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the\nlord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by\nthe whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to\ndefer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord of Lucca\nby the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco\nBoccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had corrupted; and he\nwas afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected prince by the people.\nAt this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into\nItaly to assume the Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that\nhe might make friends with him, met him at the head of five hundred\nhorsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi,\nwho was held in high estimation, because of the people\'s love for\nthe memory of his father. Castruccio was received in great honour by\nFrederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, and he was\nappointed the emperor\'s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans\nwere in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out\nof Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick\ncreated Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the\nGuelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to\naccept him as their lord.\n\nFrederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian\naffairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines,\nwho followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help\nand counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country,\nif enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were\nMatteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero\nBuonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the\nsecret intention of becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of\nthese men and of his own forces; and in order to gain greater weight\nin affairs, he entered into a league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the\nPrince of Milan, and organized for him the forces of his city and the\ncountry districts. As Lucca had five gates, he divided his own country\ndistricts into five parts, which he supplied with arms, and enrolled the\nmen under captains and ensigns, so that he could quickly bring into the\nfield twenty thousand soldiers, without those whom he could summon to\nhis assistance from Pisa. While he surrounded himself with these forces\nand allies, it happened at Messer Matteo Visconti was attacked by\nthe Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven out the Ghibellines with the\nassistance of a Florentine army and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo\ncalled upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in their own\nterritories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be compelled\nto draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend themselves.\nCastruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San Miniato,\ninflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the Florentines\nrecalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio\nwas forced by other necessities to return to Lucca.\n\nThere resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so\npowerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance\nhim to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not\nreceived such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited\nother families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found\ntheir opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the\nlieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him.\nThey endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a\npeaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and\ncompelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered\nto be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what\nthey desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater\nintelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard\nthe news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi\nin command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home.\nContrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he\nposted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As\nit appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to\nhim, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf,\nfor he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to\npardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their\nformer friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to\ntheir house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano\nto reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find\nthe tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its\ninception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying\nthat he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing his\nclemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio they\nsurrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison and\nput to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato,\nwhereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did not\nappear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave him.\nHe approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which they\nreadily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous of\ngetting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them for\ntwo years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they had\nmade. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his attention\nto affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be subject to\nthe perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various pretences\nand reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition might\naspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving them\nof country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life\nalso, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to\nbe trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca\nwith the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out\nof the state.\n\nWhilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his\nposition in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of\nincreasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could\nget possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was\nhis great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with\nthe mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties\nconfided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had\nbeen, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was\nBastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men\nheld secret communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive\nthe other out of the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to\nblows. Jacopo fortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that\nof the Lucchese side of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than\nin the Florentines, because they believed that Castruccio was far more\nready and willing to fight than the Florentines, and they both sent to\nhim for assistance. He gave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he\nwould come in person, and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo\nGuinigi. At the appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa,\nand went himself direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside\nthe city, and both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders\nentered, and at a signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia,\nand the other Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed\nthe partisans of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia\npassed into the hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to\nleave the palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him,\nmaking them many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside\nflocked to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope\nand quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great\nvalour.\n\nAbout this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness\nof living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The\nGerman governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened--murders and\ntumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an end\nto them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call\nin Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the\ncity, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could\napply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only\nto give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio\nconsidered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this\nservice, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any\ntime the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command\nat Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where\nhe was received by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time\nthe presence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that,\nwithout bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by\nreason of Castruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa\nlarge quantities of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble.\nWhen he had chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others,\nvoluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many\nhonours, and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the\ngreatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had\nthe following words embroidered on its front: \"I am what God wills.\"\nWhilst on the back was: \"What God desires shall be.\"\n\nDuring this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio\nshould have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could\ntempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult\nin his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi\nand Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These\nmen kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the\naid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out\nsome of Castruccio\'s officials and partisans, and killing others, they\nrestored the city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered\nCastruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to\nPistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would\nlose no time, they decided to intercept him with their forces in the\nVal di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so they would cut off his\nroad to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph\ncause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other\nhand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard\nwhere the Florentines\' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains\nof Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as\nhe possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He\nbelieved that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured,\nalthough he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men,\nwhilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence\nin his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to\nattack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers.\nSerravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill\nwhich blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a\nbowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst in\ngeneral it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the summit\nwhere the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could hold it.\nThe lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio\nbecame lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in possession of the\ncastle, it being common to the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed\nby either--neither of them wishing to displace Manfred as long as he\nkept his promise of neutrality, and came under obligations to no one.\nFor these reasons, and also because the castle was well fortified,\nhe had always been able to maintain his position. It was here that\nCastruccio had determined to fall upon his enemy, for here his few men\nwould have the advantage, and there was no fear lest, seeing the large\nmasses of the hostile force before they became engaged, they should not\nstand. As soon as this trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the\nimmense advantage which possession of this castle would give him, and\nhaving an intimate friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed\nmatters so with him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted\ninto the castle the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the\ncastellan put to death.\n\nCastruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the\nFlorentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away\nfrom Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his\narmy from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached\ntheir encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the\nfollowing morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at\nnight, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence\nat midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he\nand the Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in\nthe morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road,\nand a troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the\ncastle. The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of\ntheir army which was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in\npossession of the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the\ncastle. Thus it happened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill\nwere completely taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of\nCastruccio, and so close were they upon it they had scarcely time to\npull down their visors. It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked\nby ready, and they were assailed with such vigour that with difficulty\nthey could hold their own, although some few of them got through. When\nthe noise of the fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was\nfilled with confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably\nmixed: the captains were unable to get their men either backward or\nforward, owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult\nno one knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time\nthe cavalry who were engaged with the enemy\'s infantry were scattered\nor killed without having made any effective defence because of their\nunfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered\na stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on\nboth flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their\nfriends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a\ndecisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand\ninfantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred\nhorsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole\nforce to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried out\nwith such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack,\nbut gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by their\nunfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the\nrear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each\nman seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very\nsanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were\nBandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all\nFlorentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the\nFlorentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs.\nImmediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the\nfriends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not\ncontent with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both\nsides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,\nabout two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the\nspoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding\nhorse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals\nin commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to\ncorrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city\ngates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the participators\nin it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci and\nLambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great\nanxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to\nKing Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and he,\nknowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph cause\nwas to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to receive from\nthem a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and he send his\nson Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.\n\nShortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the\npressure of Castruccio\'s army, owing to his being compelled to leave\nhis positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a\nconspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,\none of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland\nshould be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this\nconspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of\nCastruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy\npaucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few\nare not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy\nLanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.\nThis betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio\nCerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering\ntheir banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put\nhim to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their\nfamilies into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and\nPistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and energy\nupon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines their\nopportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo,\nthe son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose\nno more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand\ninfantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called to their aid every\nGuelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack\nPistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to march on\nthe latter--a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to\nsucceed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed that the\nsurrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.\n\nIn the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army\nand quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from\nthence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army\nwhich the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree\nalarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would\ndeliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to\nthink that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects\nof success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand\nfoot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to\nFucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand\ninfantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in\nthe Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and\nGusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain. Moreover,\nthe enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they divided\ntheir forces, nor could they approach it either from the direction\nof Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or attack\nCastruccio\'s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they would\nfind themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his own\ncommand and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they would\nhave to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, an\nundertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take\nthis latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the\nriver and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide\nexpanse of land between them and the river.\n\nThe Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to\ndecide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,\nhaving weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the\nlatter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet\nthe water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the\nsaddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines\ncommenced the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten\nthousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and\nwho well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five\nthousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to\nissue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one thousand\nlight infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the Arno. The\ninfantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the\nwater that they were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst\nthe cavalry had made the passage of the river more difficult for the\nothers, by reason of the few who had crossed having broken up the bed of\nthe river, and this being deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over\nwith their riders and many of them had stuck so fast that they could not\nmove. When the Florentine captains saw the difficulties their men were\nmeeting, they withdrew them and moved higher up the river, hoping to\nfind the river bed less treacherous and the banks more adapted for\nlanding. These men were met at the bank by the forces which Castruccio\nhad already sent forward, who, being light armed with bucklers and\njavelins in their hands, let fly with tremendous shouts into the faces\nand bodies of the cavalry. The horses, alarmed by the noise and the\nwounds, would not move forward, and trampled each other in great\nconfusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and those of the\nenemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both sides\nfought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The soldiers\nof Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, whilst the\nFlorentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make room for\nthe others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the water\nwould be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were urged\non by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the\nsame enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the\nFlorentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by\nthe few. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted,\nand that both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that\nboth sides had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of\ninfantry to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting;\nhe then commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended\nto retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to\nthe left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took\nadvantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield.\nBut when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with\nCastruccio\'s reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell\nback into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained\nany decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his\ninferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the\ndefensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that\nwhen he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work\nof the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the\nFlorentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder\nof his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with\nlance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the\nenemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine\ncaptains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in\ncrossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower\ndown the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio\'s army.\nBut here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of\nCastruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines\nwere so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them\nescaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were\ntaken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo\nFalconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to\nEmpoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater,\nas might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell\ntwenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost\none thousand five hundred and seventy men.\n\nBut Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his\nlife just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined\nall those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into\neffect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death\ncould have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the\nwhole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and\noverheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on\ntheir return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the\nwatch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day;\nhe being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the\nfirst man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood\nexposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno,\nand which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which\nhe thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was\nthe cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with high\nfever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove\nfatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and\naddressed him as follows:\n\n\"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the\nmidst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my\nsuccesses promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have\nleft thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,\nbecause I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and\nPisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the\nFlorentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these\npeoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least more\npeacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but one\nmore secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who\ninsists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me\nwith sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time\nto surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have\nnever concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a\nboy--a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should\nfeel--and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been\nborn of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and\ncapable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been\nwitness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all his\npossessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, and\nincreased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And in\norder that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy father\nleft, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, I have\nnever married, so that the love of children should never deflect my mind\nfrom that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I\nleave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply\nconcerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast\nthe city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under\nthey government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature\nchangeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held\nin subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese.\nPistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and\ndeeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently\ninflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended Florentines,\ninjured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, who\nwill hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the\nacquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan\nthou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their\nhelp is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything\nbut in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the\nprestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou\nknowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms\nwith the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great\ndefeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought\nto make them my enemies, because I believed that war with them would\nconduce to my power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make\nfriends of them, because their alliance will bring thee advantages\nand security. It is of the greatest important in this world that a man\nshould know himself, and the measure of his own strength and means; and\nhe who knows that he has not a genius for fighting must learn how to\ngovern by the arts of peace. And it will be well for thee to rule\nthey conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my\nlife-work and dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed\nwhen thou hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And\nthou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm\nand have taught thee how to keep it.\"\n\nAfter this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and\nLucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo\nto them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he\ndied. He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no\nprince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His\nobsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried\nin San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi\nas she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long\nafter the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and\nonly with difficulty held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the\nfamily of Guinigi until the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo.\n\nFrom what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a\nman of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own\ntime, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above\nthe ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious\npresence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke\nwith him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,\nand he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or\nsnowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,\nbut terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false\nwith the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he\ndesired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory\nthat brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was\nbolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He\nwas accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear\nnothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees that\nthe weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully sharp or\nbiting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look for any\nindulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not angered\nwith others did not show it to him. It has often happened that he has\nlistened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the\nfollowing occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge,\nand was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had\nsaid: \"You would not have given more than a penny.\" \"That is true,\"\nanswered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: \"A ducat is much less\nto me.\" Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that\nhe scorned him, the flatterer said to him: \"Fisherman are willing to let\nthe waters of the sea saturate them in order that they make take a few\nlittle fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may\ncatch a whale\"; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience\nbut rewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live\nso sumptuously, Castruccio said: \"If that be a vice than you should\nnot fare so splendidly at the feasts of our saints.\" Passing through a\nstreet he saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at\nbeing seen by Castruccio, and said to him: \"Thou shouldst not be ashamed\nwhen thou comest out, but when thou goest into such places.\" A friend\ngave him a very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: \"Fool, do\nyou think that I wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to\nfasten.\" Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: \"You\nare like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best\nto eat,\" and was answered: \"We are rather like the doctors who go to the\nhouses of those who have the greatest need of them.\" Going by water from\nPisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that\nsprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by one of those with him,\nwho said that he did not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he\ndid not wonder at that, since every man valued his soul for what is was\nworth. Being asked by one what he ought to do to gain estimation, he\nsaid: \"When thou goest to a banquet take care that thou dost not seat\none piece of wood upon another.\" To a person who was boasting that he\nhad read many things, Castruccio said: \"He knows better than to boast\nof remembering many things.\" Someone bragged that he could drink much\nwithout becoming intoxicated. Castruccio replied: \"An ox does the\nsame.\" Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate\nrelations, and being blamed by a friend who told him that it was\nundignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: \"She has not\ntaken me in, I have taken her.\" Being also blamed for eating very dainty\nfoods, he answered: \"Thou dost not spend as much as I do?\" and being\ntold that it was true, he continued: \"Then thou art more avaricious\nthan I am gluttonous.\" Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and\nsplendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown\nby Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones\nrepresenting flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring.\nCastruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon\nTaddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: \"I knew not\nwhere to spit in order to offend thee less.\" Being asked how Caesar\ndied he said: \"God willing I will die as he did.\" Being one night in the\nhouse of one of his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was\nreproved by one of his friends for dancing and amusing himself with\nthem more than was usual in one of his station, so he said: \"He who is\nconsidered wise by day will not be considered a fool at night.\" A person\ncame to demand a favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening\nto his plea threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply\nreproved by Castruccio, said: \"Thou art the reason of my acting thus for\nthou hast thy ears in thy feet,\" whereupon he obtained double the favour\nhe had asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy\none, seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled\nblindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous\nwords, he said to him: \"When you have another request to make, send\nsomeone else to make it.\" Having been wearied by a similar man with a\nlong oration who wound up by saying: \"Perhaps I have fatigued you by\nspeaking so long,\" Castruccio said: \"You have not, because I have not\nlistened to a word you said.\" He used to say of one who had been a\nbeautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was\ndangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he\ntook the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he\nsaid: \"Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is\nunfortunate?\" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco\nGuinigi, one of his companions said to him: \"What shall I give you if\nyou will let me give you a blow on the nose?\" Castruccio answered:\n\"A helmet.\" Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been\ninstrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done\nwrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived\nthemselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly\nthose men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying\nthat they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused\nwhen the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that\nwhilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to\nlearn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with\nonly looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to\nbe buried when he died, and answered: \"With the face turned downwards,\nfor I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.\" On\nbeing asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to\nsave his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared strange\nto him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della\nFaggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to\npreserve his health, and replied: \"If the man be rich let him eat\nwhen he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.\" Seeing on of his\ngentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: \"I\npray God that you will let him feed you also.\" Seeing that someone had\nwritten upon his house in Latin the words: \"May God preserve this house\nfrom the wicked,\" he said, \"The owner must never go in.\" Passing through\none of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door, and\nremarked: \"That house will fly through the door.\" He was having a\ndiscussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the\nproperty of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, and\nthe ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. \"Is this king of\nyours a bad man or a good one?\" asked Castruccio, and was told that he\nwas a good one, whereupon he said, \"Why should you suggest that I should\nbe afraid of a good man?\"\n\nI could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and\nweighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to\nhis high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a\nprince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune,\nso he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune;\ntherefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be\nseen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were\nplaced by him to testify for ever to his days of adversity. As in\nhis life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of\nAlexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his\nage as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had\nFortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia\nor Rome.'"